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An important legacy of Nathan Rosenberg’s work is the notion of general purpose 
technologies (GPTs). This paper studies whether and when firms specialize in 
developing GPTs and trading them in intermediate markets, a strategy we call 
“specialization in generality.”  In particular, we address whether this is a strategy 
adopted by young firms or instead a long-term strategy adopted by established 
firms—against the “common wisdom” that such firms specialize in downstream 





One of Nathan Rosenberg’s most important contributions is the role played by general 
purpose technologies (GPTs)—technologies such as the steam engine and electricity, 
characterized by their broad applicability in many markets—as engines of economic 
growth (e.g. Rosenberg, 1982). This intuition spurred an established and still growing 
body of research. Within this research stream, some scholars explored the conditions 
under which the development of a GPT determines technical advance in downstream 
sectors in a decentralized economy  (e.g. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995); other 
scholars focused on the economy-wide impact in terms of innovation and productivity 
levels that GPTs generate as they diffuse in the economy (Helpman and Trajtenberg, 
1998); yet others analyzed the interdependence between GPTs and the division of 
innovative labour (Bresnahan and Gambardella, 1998).  
Most research on GPTs, however, has investigated the impact and the 
implication of such technologies at the economy level. Only recently have scholars 
begun to look at general technologies from a firm-level perspective, focusing more 
closely on the appropriability concerns of an individual firm that has developed a 
general technology and that aims to capture its value.  
Understanding more about the firm-level issues related to the development 
and exploitation of general technologies is clearly important from a societal 
perspective—if anything because, due to the lack of private incentives, there might be 
a suboptimal number of firms specializing in the production of GPTs (Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg, 1995). However, it is also important, and possibly even more so, from a 
managerial perspective, because the existence and the exploitation of GPTs might 
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enhance the variety of strategies that firms pursue (Gambardella and McGahan, 
2010).  
In particular, firms might take advantage of GPTs by vertically specializing in 
producing and selling them to downstream players (Conti et al., 2017; Bresnahan and 
Gambardella, 1998; Rosenberg, 1982), a strategy we label “specialization in general 
purpose technology” or “specialization in generality.” However, we still know little 
about this strategy. In particular, to what extent can it be a long-term strategy pursued 
by companies as they age?   
This paper aims to respond to these questions by exploring whether and under 
what conditions specializing in generality is a transitional strategy—exclusively 
employed by firms while still collecting the resources they need for growth (e.g. 
Kogut, 1991; Teece, 1986)—or whether it is sustainable in the long term, and 
therefore adopted by firms as they age. We also identify two conditions—one external 
and one internal to the firm—conducive to embracing specialization in generality as a 
long-term strategy: the former is the extent to which the downstream market faced by 
firms takes a deep versus a broad configuration (Bresnahan and Gambardella, 1998); 
the latter is the extent to which firms have committed resources to R&D.  
We empirically test our predictions in the laser industry in the period 1993–
2001. This is an ideal empirical setting for testing our theoretical framework, for 
several reasons. First, the crucial upstream resource in this industry is the laser 
technology itself, and firms might choose to produce (and sell) more general purpose 
or more dedicated laser technologies, that is, technologies having more or fewer 
applications (each one linked to a specific downstream market). Second, the laser 
industry is vertically disintegrated: it is populated by laser producers (producing 
“lasers” as standalone intermediate technologies) and laser systems manufacturers 
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(embedding lasers into “laser systems,” which are “ready to use” downstream 
products). This implies that, in this context, intermediate markets for laser 
technologies exist and work smoothly. 
Our results are consistent with the hypotheses we develop and show that 
specialization in generality can be a long-term strategy, especially when firms have 
made substantial investment in R&D, and potential technology buyers are 
homogenously distributed across the different downstream markets where the GPT 
can potentially be applied.  
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Nathan Rosenberg’s research contributes greatly to our understanding of the 
connections between the technical characteristics of a technology and its economic 
implications, and in particular of the degree to which a technology can spur growth by 
inducing vertical specialization and the division of the innovative labor.  
In particular, according to Rosenberg, some technologies have an impact only 
in some sectors of the economy, while others—such as the steam engine and 
electricity—have widespread impact, beyond the industry for which they were 
originally created (Rosenberg, 1982). This is due to their general-purpose-ness, or 
their capacity to perform a generic function that is central to the functioning of a large 
number of products and production systems (Rosenberg and Trajtenberg, 2001). As 
general technologies diffuse, they tend to generate complementary investments in the 
application sectors, which lead to increased demand for general technologies and 
ultimately generate sustained economic growth (Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998; 
Rosenberg and Trajtenberg, 2001).  
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The connection between GPTs and demand is particularly interesting: demand 
for a GPT comes from all sectors in which the general technology might be applied 
(Rosenberg, 1982). Thus, general technologies are more likely to impel the division of 
innovative labour and vertical disintegration in the economy. Indeed, the “extent of 
the market” tends to be larger for general technologies than for dedicated ones. 
Therefore, GPTs are more likely to economically sustain vertical specialization, or the 
creation of a class of upstream companies that specialize in producing GPTs and that 
trade, in intermediate markets, such technologies to downstream firms (Bresnahan 
and Gambardella, 1998; Smith, 1776; Stigler, 1951). Rosenberg (1982: 71) himself 
emphasized that general technologies lead to “wholly new patterns of specialization,” 
with “the emergence of specialized firms and industries that produce no final product 
at all—only capital goods.”  
Rosenberg (1982: 71) also suggested that as the economy becomes 
increasingly characterized by  the presence of specialized GPT suppliers and high 
rates of GPT  purchases from downstream buyers in other industries,  not taking these 
buyer–supplier “relationships fully into account is a fundamental limitation of most of 
the recent literature on technological innovation.” Trying to address such limitation, 
in the last 30 years, research in this area has explored the implications of the existence 
of a class of specialized GPT suppliers at the economy and industry levels. Most such 
research has taken a social welfare perspective. For instance, Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg (1995) considered the role of GPTs as “engines of growth,” pointing out 
that advances in GPT lead to new opportunities for applications and that, at the same 
time, development of GPT-using applications increases returns to new advances in 
GPT. This positive feedback between the upstream GPT industry and the downstream 
application sectors is challenged by coordination problems, however: when the GPT 
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and the applications are supplied by different firms, these different parties do not 
internalize all the benefits from their investments for the technical progress of the 
GPT or its applications. As a result, each party might end up investing “too little, too 
late” such that the economy might display a (socially) suboptimal level of investment 
in GPT.  
However, most industry-level studies on GPT, including Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg (1995), assumed the existence of a class of upstream GPT suppliers—and 
possibly investigated the extent to which the existence of such a class is socially 
optimal (e.g. Bresnahan and Gambardella, 1998). Our work, by taking a private firm 
perspective—and in particular the perspective of an upstream firm considering 
whether to invest in a general technology for trading or not—studies instead the 
internal and external conditions that make a class of upstream suppliers more likely to 
emerge and persist over time. In this sense, our work tries to provide the micro-
foundations to the GPT industry-level studies. 
To this purpose, we address two main questions: Which contingencies lead 
upstream firms to specialize in the production and trading of general technologies in 
intermediate markets? And, in particular, under which conditions is this specialization 
in generality a “temporary” strategy (mainly pursued by firms lacking the 
complementary assets and the expertise to enter downstream) versus a “long-term” 
strategy chosen by firms as they age?  
Important insights to address these questions are provided by research 
focusing on the strategies that firms can use to commercialize their technologies (e.g. 
Teece, 1986). Two main modes of commercialization—cooperative and 
competitive—have been identified in this domain. A cooperative commercialization 
mode corresponds to the situation in which an upstream firm that has developed a 
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technology commercializes it by trading or cooperating with other downstream firms, 
who will then integrate it into their products and sell these in the product markets. 
Cooperation between the upstream technology developer and the downstream buyer 
can be regulated in different ways, for example via arm’s-length transactions, 
licensing agreements or alliances (e.g. Aggarwal and Hsu, 2009; Kogut, 1991; Teece, 
1986). In a competitive commercialization mode, instead, the upstream firm directly 
integrates downstream and commercializes its technology into products (e.g. Arora et 
al., 2001).  
Research in this area has generally assumed that cooperative 
commercialization modes or strategies are the natural precursor to competitive 
commercialization strategies, such that firms tend to use cooperative strategies early 
on to compensate for their lack of the relevant physical or reputational resources to 
directly enter downstream (e.g. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Teece, 1986). The 
intuition here is that the development or acquisition of these downstream assets is 
subject to time-compression diseconomies, such that firms must necessarily begin 
their commercialization efforts by cooperating with other firms that already possess 
those assets. Once a firm has gathered the relevant downstream resources and 
expertise, however, it can switch to competitive commercialization modes.  
Nevertheless, very recent research in this area suggests that this course of 
action—cooperative commercialization as the precursor to competitive 
commercialization—might not apply to some firms (e.g. Gans and Stern, 2003; Marx 
and Hsu, 2015), calling for new research in this domain. For instance, firms might 
persist in a cooperative commercialization mode when the downstream market is 
characterized by strong economies of scale (and therefore resembles a natural 
monopoly with no room for entrance) or strong competition (and downstream entry is 
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therefore not attractive for upstream firms), or when IPR protection is strong (and 
therefore upstream firms might continue trading their technologies, as they do not 
face the risk of expropriation by potential buyers; e.g. Gans and Stern,  2003; Marx 
and Hsu, 2015). 
Even more important for our research question, most research on 
commercialization strategies has mainly explored firms’ commercialization choice in 
isolation, overlooking its interdependence with the choice about the nature of the 
firm’s technological investments. This is a notable gap, since there is a close 
interdependence between the nature of a technology that a firm has invested in—and 
in particular whether this technology is general or dedicated—and the technology 
commercialization mode (e.g. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Macher and 
Mowery, 2004; Rosenberg, 1982).  
Indeed, when the choice of technology commercialization mode (cooperative 
vs. competitive) and the choice of whether to invest in a GPT or not are considered 
simultaneously, four possible technology commercialization strategies emerge (Table 
1): simple trading, where a firm does not integrate downstream and instead 
commercializes in intermediate markets a dedicated technology via arm’s-length or 
cooperative agreements; specialization in generality, where a firm does not integrate 
downstream and instead commercializes a general technology via arm’s-length or 
cooperative agreements; simple downstream entry, where a firm selectively enters the 
few downstream sectors where its dedicated technology can be applied; and 
synergistic downstream entry, where a firm enters the multiple downstream sectors 
where its general technology can be applied.  
***** INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ***** 
	
10 
Note that—within prior research that has neglected the interdependence 
between the nature of the technology and the type of commercialization chosen—the 
first two strategies (“simple trading” and “specialization in generality”) would be seen 
as equivalent, in that they fall into the “cooperative strategy” category. Similarly, the 
latter two strategies (“simple downstream entry” and “synergistic downstream entry”) 
would both be generally classified as belonging to the “competitive strategy” 
category. This supports the idea that simultaneously considering both choices of 
technology commercialization mode and of whether to invest versus not to invest in a 
GPT is important: following the traditional categorization, any strategic difference 
related to the nature of the commercialized technologies would be completely 
neglected. Recognizing this difference helps refine the tenet that older firms, given 
the necessary marketing expertise, choose to enter downstream, whereas younger 
firms choose instead to trade (e.g. Teece, 1986). We argue that this conclusion is only 
partly true, as the relationship between firm age and commercialization mode also 
crucially depends on the general versus dedicated nature of the technology the firm 
has invested in. 
Specifically, it is true that the commercialization of either a dedicated or a 
general technology through downstream entry requires firms to gain access to those 
downstream complementary assets in order to incorporate the technology into a 
product that can be sold to the final consumer (e.g. Teece, 1986). Getting proprietary 
access to these assets requires time. Hence, younger firms are more likely to choose 
arm’s-lengths transactions (or licensing agreements or alliances), whereas older firms, 
which control the necessary downstream assets (including marketing expertise), are, 




However, compared with the use of a “cooperative” strategy for the 
commercialization of a dedicated technology, the commercial exploitation of a 
general technology through a cooperative strategy is more complex and requires 
developing peculiar expertise, which is likely to happen gradually and over time. In 
fact, trading a GPT to downstream users operating in different markets is conditional 
on a crucial intermediate step, in that the general technology needs to be “adapted” to 
those different markets (e.g. Bresnahan and Gambardella, 1998). Adapting the design 
of a general technology to different markets requires that firms acquire relevant 
complementary assets such as market expertise in the different target markets as well 
as design expertise to modify the underlying technology. The accumulation of these 
assets is subject to time-compression diseconomies. Hence, the cooperative 
commercialization of a general technology via arm’s-length agreements (i.e. a 
specialization in generality strategy) is likely to require more time than the simple 
trading of a dedicated technology (e.g. Teece, 1986). This implies that a specialization 
in generality strategy is more likely to be employed by firms as they age and develop 
the required expertise to pursue such a strategy—which therefore, similar to 
downstream entry, is most likely a “long-term” option. Therefore, we propose the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1: Similar to downstream entry, a specialization in generality 
strategy is more likely to be employed by firms as they age.  
A question naturally emerges: As firms age, which ones choose a 
specialization in generality strategy (as opposed to entering downstream)? That is, 
which conditions make specialization in generality a viable strategy? We suggest that 
such relevant conditions might be either internal to the firms or external and related to 
the economic environment where they operate.  
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In particular, from the external standpoint, the long-term viability of a 
specialization in generality strategy will depend on the characteristics of downstream 
demand for technologies (e.g. Rosenberg, 1982). The distribution of demand for 
technologies in downstream markets can take multiple different configurations 
(Bresnahan and Gambardella, 1998) and range between “broad”—the potential 
technology buyers are spread equally across the various markets where the technology 
could be applied—and “deep”—the potential technology buyers are concentrated in 
just one or a few markets. For example, suppose 100 downstream firms (i.e., the 
potential technology buyers) are spread over 10 markets. We would say that demand 
is broad if there are 10 downstream firms in each of the 10 markets. We would say 
that demand is deep when, instead, 91 downstream potential technology buyers 
operate in one market and the other 9 markets include only just downstream firm 
each. 
As firms age, their cumulative acquisition of technical and market expertise to 
adapt a general technology to different markets makes specialization in generality 
possible. Yet, the appeal for the focal firm of specialization in generality as a strategy 
is likely to be higher when demand for technologies is broad, because a general 
technology is particularly appropriate for exploiting the diverse needs of multiple 
downstream markets of similar size. When demand for technologies is deep, instead, 
specialization in generality is not particularly attractive for a focal firm: because most 
potential technology buyers are concentrated in one or a few large markets, targeting 
markets in addition to the main one(s) where most of the buyers are concentrated does 
not increase demand substantially, and it requires additional technology adaptation 
costs. Overall, the broader (vs. deeper) the demand, the more firms are likely to 
pursue a specialization in generality strategy. Therefore, we hypothesize as follows: 
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Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of specializing in generality increases with age 
especially when demand is broad versus deep.  
From the firm’s internal standpoint, the exploitation of a more general 
technology requires investment in technical skills for adapting the technology to the 
different markets in which the technology can be used (Bresnahan and Gambardella, 
1998; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). As firms age, they tend to develop market 
knowledge of the needs of users in different markets and of how the technology could 
potentially serve those markets. However, market knowledge needs to be 
complemented with investment in technological ability to modify the general 
technology and apply it to the different markets. In other words, to pursue a 
specialization in generality strategy, firms must combine market expertise with 
substantial investment in R&D. Hence, we propose as follows:  
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of specializing in generality increases with age, 
especially when firms have invested more resources in R&D. 
3. Data and Empirics 
3.1 Empirical setting  
We tested our prediction building a novel longitudinal dataset on the US laser 
industry in the period 1993–2001, using an industry directory (the Photonics 
directory, by Laurin Publishing) to define industry boundaries. The term “laser”—
”light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation”—refers to devices that emit 
light through a process of optical amplification based on the stimulated emission of 
electromagnetic radiation (Hecht, 2011).  
The laser manufacturing industry has two vertical layers. Firms in the 
upstream layer produce lasers, a technology with essential components: a lasing 
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material (the gain medium), a pump source, and a laser cavity. To be used, lasers tend 
to be ultimately integrated into laser systems, which are sold to the final users. 
Upstream firms can either integrate downstream into laser systems or vertically 
specialize upstream, in the production of lasers, and sell them to downstream firms 
producing laser systems.   
Depending on their medium, lasers differ in power and in the wavelength of 
light they emit. This affects the extent of applicability (i.e. the “generality” or 
“general-purpose-ness”) of each individual type of laser and, consequently, the extent 
to which it can be used in different laser systems targeted to biomedical/medical (e.g. 
medical imaging, dermatology), information processing (e.g. scanning, optical disk 
reading), telecommunications (e.g. data transmission, pulse generation), military (e.g. 
target designation), and industrial (e.g. cutting, welding, marking) applications.  
To build our sample, we selected all firms that in 1993 were active in the 
upstream laser industry but not in the downstream laser system industry. We collected 
data for these firms until 2001 or until the year they entered the laser system industry, 
whichever was earlier. Conversation with industry experts and cross-checks across 
sources revealed that this sample is generally representative of the industry during 
that period. It also includes firms that entered or exited the industry during the period, 
limiting any survival bias.  
We extracted information on firm characteristics (e.g. independence status, 
size, age, location) for each year from the industry directory. We used the same 
directory to collect information on the laser and laser system types that each firm was 
producing in each year as well as information on firm entry and trading. We chose our 
time window for empirical reasons: during the period 1993–2001 the number of 
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possible laser applications increased considerably due to the dramatic diffusion of the 
Internet.  
We matched data on firms’ characteristics with firms’ patent data from the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patents database using firm names 
and locations and matched them to patent assignees’ names. The NBER data set 
provides patent data consolidated at the parent–portfolio level for public firms. For 
private firms, we used the D&B Who Owns Whom database to build a list of their 
worldwide subsidiaries for each year of the study. We matched this list with the 
NBER data set to obtain the list of patents filed by each of the firm’s subsidiaries and 
to consolidate the list of patents at the parent–firm level. This procedure yields a 
sample of 82 firms corresponding to 306 firm-year observations. 
The laser industry is an ideal setting for testing our theory, for several reasons. 
First, the industry has a clear vertical structure and smooth and efficient intermediate 
markets where laser technologies are exchanged between upstream suppliers (i.e. 
companies producing lasers) and downstream buyers (firms buying those lasers for 
embedding them into final downstream products). 
Second, firms vary in the generality of their upstream technological 
knowledge such that some firms have more general upstream technological 
knowledge (and thus produce lasers for use in a large number of laser systems for 
different markets) and some have less general upstream technological knowledge (and 
thus produce lasers targeted to specific downstream applications and related 
downstream markets).  
Third, in the period studied, the applications of lasers expanded considerably 
in new downstream markets, such that firms in the laser industry faced precisely the 
choice of whether to enter these new markets by direct entry or by trading in the 
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corresponding intermediate markets. Interesting for our analysis, the directory we use 
for data collection is meant to be an outlet for firms to advertise their lasers and/or 
laser systems. Hence, by construction, if a firm is reported in the directory, it is 
exploiting new markets either by trading as an upstream supplier of intermediate 
products (lasers) or by operating downstream (as a seller of laser system)—consistent 
with our theoretical framework. 
3.2 Methodology 
We tested our hypotheses by using a linear probability model and estimated the 
probability that a firm employs a specialization in generality strategy as a function of 
its age, and the interaction between age and the core independent variables. Following 
previous studies (e.g. Azoulay et al., 2010), we use a linear probability model (rather 
than a non-linear logit or probit model), for three main reasons. First, a linear 
probability model allows us to easily control for firm time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics without losing any observations. Accounting for any firm-constant 
characteristics is crucial to obtaining reliable estimates. For instance, high-quality 
firms not only might survive more (such that firm time-invariant quality might be 
positively correlated with age) but also might choose a specialization in generality 
strategy—which, as we said, is a demanding strategy. This would obviously bias our 
estimates. Second, we are interested not only in the direct effect of age on the choice 
to pursue a specialization in generality strategy but also on the interaction effect 
between age and the structure of demand, on one side, and firm R&D investment, on 
the other side. Using a linear probability model makes the economic and statistical 
interpretation of the interaction effect quite straightforward. Finally, we are 
theoretically interested in assessing the effect of age on the probability of any firm 
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changing its strategy over time, which occurs in about 13% of our observations. 
Indeed, our main research goal is to understand the effect of time passing on such 
within-firm strategy variation—and in particular on the likelihood that a focal 
upstream firm adopts a specialization in generality strategy. 
3.3 Variables 
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable, Specialization in generality, is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm vertically specializes in the 
production of general technologies. Specifically, it takes the value 1 if two conditions 
occur simultaneously: (1) the firm trades the technology in intermediate markets and 
does not integrate downstream in year t, and (2) the firm invests in general 
technology; that is, it increases the generality of its technological portfolio, in year t. 
Specifically, to measure investment in general technology, we look at each firm’s 
laser portfolio. We take advantage of the fact that laser technology has several 
possible market applications depending on the laser medium.i Based on the medium, 
lasers can be classified into the following categories: Alexandrite; ArF; Argon–Ion; 
CO2; CO2 TEA; Metal Vapor; Diode; Dye; Er:Glass; Er:YAG; Excimer; HeNe; 
Krypton–Ion; Nd:YAG; Ruby; Thulium; HeCd; KrF; Lead Salt; Nd: Glass; 
Ti:Sapphire; Color–Center; HF/DF; and Holmium YAG. Each laser category can be 
used in a broader versus narrower range of applications. For instance, a KrF laser can 
be applied to industrial drilling but not to applications in dermatology. An Er:Glass 
laser, however, is appropriate for use in dermatology but not in laser drilling. A third 
alternative, the Alexandrite laser, can be used for applications in both dermatology 
and industrial drilling. Therefore, the Alexandrite laser is a more general technology 
than the KrF or the Er:Glass lasers. To measure the generality of firm technology, we 
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first measure the individual laser’s degree of generality by calculating the ratio of the 
number of uses/markets to which the specific laser type can be applied to the total 
number of applications/markets across all laser types. We then compute the degree of 
the firm’s technology generality in each year by considering the average degree of 
generality of the lasers in the firm’s portfolio. Finally, we measure whether firms 
invested in general technologies by looking at whether a firm has increased its 
average laser generality from year t–1 to year t. 
Independent variables. Our core independent variable is Firm age, measured 
as the number of years elapsed from the firm’s foundation to year t–1. We observe its 
association with the dependent variable to test our first hypothesis. We interact this 
variable with two other variables to test our second and third hypotheses. We 
construct the variable Breadth of demand as 1 minus the Herfindhal index of 
concentration of downstream buyers across markets, for each firm-year. In more 
detail, for each firm in the sample that supplies lasers, and for each year in which that 
firm is active, we consider the markets in which the focal firm’s lasers are potentially 
applicable and how broadly the downstream firms are operating in these markets 
(which therefore constitute potential buyers for the focal firms’ lasers) distributed 
across them. Finally, we construct the variable R&D intensity as the ratio of the firm’s 
number of engineers to the firm’s number of employees. 
Control variables. In all specifications, we include as an additional control 
variable the Number of lasers, which controls for the number of different types of 
lasers produced by the firm and which might correlate with both the 
commercialization mode chosen by the companies, on one side, and the age of firms 
(e.g. older and more experienced firms might produce more lasers). We also control 
for the Number of patents applied for and granted to the firm in the five years prior to 
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the focal year, as the technological competence of a company might naturally 
correlate not only with the general or dedicated nature of firm technologies but also 
with firm age. Also, Firm size (number of employees) appears to be a natural control 
to include in the regression, given its obvious correlation with age. Finally, we 
introduce year fixed effects,ii to control for time-variant factors affecting all firms in 
our samples—for example, economic downturns—and firm fixed effects to control 
for firm unobserved and time-invariant heterogeneity. 
4. Results 
Tables 2 and 3 display the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations between 
variables. Overall, in the period considered, firms’ likelihood to choose a 
specialization in generality is about 18%, which suggests that this strategy is relevant. 
Note also that the probability of investing in GPTs almost perfectly overlaps with the 
probability of adopting a specialization in generality strategy. That is, in our sample 
composed of firms without any downstream assets, all firms that invest in GPTs 
decide to remain upstream and to trade technologies in intermediate markets—this 
naturally implies that we do not have any firms investing in GPTs to enter 
downstream, which is what we called a “synergistic entry” strategy. 
***** INSERT TABLES 2 & 3 ABOUT HERE *****  
Table 4 reports the results of several linear probability models, including firm 
fixed effects. We first consider the effect of age on the mere probability of staying 
upstream (vs. entering downstream)—which is what the previous literature mainly 
considered. Results in column (1) show that firm age is negatively associated with the 
choice of a cooperative commercialization mode, that is, remaining upstream and 
commercializing technologies by trading them or cooperating with other downstream 
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firms (beta=-0.017, p–value<0.01). Note that the variable Cooperative 
commercialization mode does not account for the type of technology the firm has 
invested in (i.e. whether general or dedicated). This result is in line with the results of 
prior research on technology commercialization strategies that suggested that—as 
they age—firms tend to enter downstream.  
However, our theory specifically concerns the effect of age on the joint 
probability of trading and investing in more general technologies, which defines the 
specialization in generality strategy. When we consider the choice to “specialize in 
generality” (column 2), we find that firm age is positively associated with the 
probability of staying upstream and trading GPTs, that is, the probability of 
employing a specialization in generality strategy (beta=0.039, p–value<0.05) 
providing support for our first hypothesis. The effect of age is also sizable, as the 
passing of one more year increases the likelihood of choosing a specialization in 
generality strategy by almost four percentage points.  
Overall, the previous results imply that looking at the effect of age on the 
simple choice to enter versus trade might be misleading. Indeed, as suggested by 
previous research, firms do on average choose to enter downstream as they age, 
adopting a “competitive” technology commercialization mode (e.g. Teece, 1986). 
Yet, some firms choose instead to trade general technologies. In this sense, 
specializing in generality appears to be a viable long-term strategy that some firms 
pursue. 
To better characterize our findings, we also show the impact of age on the 
probability of employing a simple trading strategy (column 3) and simple downstream 
entry strategy (column 4). Results are consistent with our theoretical reasoning and 
show that age has a positive association with both specialization in generality and 
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downstream entry—as both strategies require the development of assets subject to 
time-compression diseconomies—whereas this association is reversed for the case of 
a simple trading strategy. Looking at columns 2 through 4 jointly, we can conclude 
that as firms age they tend to abandon a simple trading strategy (beta=-0.053, p–
value<0.01) and that, of those firms that switch to a different strategy, most switch to 
a specialization in generality strategy (beta=0.038, p–value<0.05) rather than to a 
downstream entry strategy (beta=0.017, p–value<0.01). 
***** INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE *****  
The analysis reported in Table 5 deepens our analysis further, showing the 
conditions under which older and more experienced firms are more likely to employ a 
specialization in generality strategy. Results show a positive association between 
specialization in generality and the interaction between Firm age and Breadth of 
demand (beta=0.063, p<0.05) as well as between specialization in generality and the 
interaction between Firm age and R&D intensity (beta=0.063, p<0.01), supporting our 
second and third hypotheses. Therefore, as firms age, the appeal of a specialization in 
generality strategy is higher when downstream buyers are homogeneously distributed 
across all possible downstream markets—because experienced firms choose to exploit 
such demand breadth, by investing in GPTs and trading them in intermediate 
markets—and for firms investing in R&D—because the technological knowledge 
acquired through R&D investments complements the market knowledge acquired by 
experienced firms, and both are needed for pursuing a specialization in generality 
strategy.  
***** INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE ***** 
One possible concern about the previous results is that our variable firm R&D 
intensity (equal to the ratio of firm engineers to the overall number of firm 
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employees) might be endogenous to the strategy that a firm adopts. To alleviate this 
problem, as a robustness check we used a time-invariant—and possibly exogenous—
measure of R&D intensity, by computing such variables in the first year that a 
company enters our database. The new time-invariant measure of R&D intensity is 
naturally exogenous with respect to any firm’s strategy change—which is the 
dependent variable we consider when including firm fixed effects and using within-
firm variation. The results we get by using the new measure are again consistent with 
our theory (Table 6). 
We also checked whether our results are robust to the use of a logarithmic 
transformation of age, size, and number of patents. Note that the non-linearity of the 
logarithmic function makes the log of age non-collinear with the year and firm fixed 
effects. Results are confirmed even when adopting such a specification (Table 7). 
***** INSERT TABLES 6 & 7 ABOUT HERE ***** 
Finally, for the sake of comparison, we also show the effect of the 
aforementioned interactions on the other possible strategies that firms might 
undertake. Interestingly, results clearly show that these interactions are not conducive 
to the other two types of strategies that firms in our sample have pursued (Table 8). 
***** INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE ***** 
5. Conclusions 
Nathan Rosenberg had sharp ideas about innovation. One was that market structures, 
and particularly the vertical relationships between suppliers and buyers, have 
important implications for the efficiency with which innovations are generated. In this 
respect, an important insight that he provided to economists, strategy scholars, and 
policy makers is that in some markets the production of GPTs can have profound 
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implications for the vertical division of innovative labor—and thus for overall 
economic efficiency. His representation of the American machine tool industry in the 
19th century is a vivid illustration of how GPTs arise and function (Rosenberg, 1982). 
This has spurred important research.  In particular, Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) 
highlight that GPTs create economic growth because of the externalities they produce. 
In fact, as they note, these externalities imply that firms have suboptimal incentives to 
produce GPTs. 
In this paper, we also take a firm-level perspective, which we believe is an 
important complement to the work of Rosenberg, and of Bresnahan and Trajtenberg. 
To be sure, we do not and cannot answer whether firms have suboptimal incentives to 
invest in GPTs because of the externalities associated with these technologies. 
However, we do address some micro-foundations on whether young or, rather, 
experienced firms invest in GPTs, and whether they do so to trade such GPTs in 
intermediate markets rather than to enter downstream.   
Tackling such questions has important implications for assessing the relevance 
of GPTs, which would obviously be magnified in a situation where GPT is a long-
term specialization strategy, such that firms find it profitable to sell GPTs in 
intermediate markets as part of their normal business activities—rather than 
considering it as a transitory phase before finding the right product application in 
which they specialize.  
Indeed, if companies investing in GPTs to trade them in intermediate markets 
were largely young firms that have not yet understood in which markets or 
technologies to specialize, investments in GPTs would likely be a residual form of 
investment in our economies. This is because many of these firms could fail, and if 
they succeeded, once they became older, they would specialize in some downstream 
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markets and no longer produce technologies that can offer advantages of 
specialization and increasing returns in terms of serving, with the same fixed 
investment, many application markets. Similarly, if GPTs were only the province of 
investments by large and diversified firms that internalize the underlying 
externalities—as suggested by Penrose (1959) and Nelson (1959)—their potential 
would still be limited, in that these firms may apply them not to all potential domains 
in which GPTs can be applied but only to the domains in which the firm 
commercializes its final products.  
The question is therefore: Do firms specialize in trading GPTs as a long-term 
strategy? That is, do we observe that firms, as they age, see long-term opportunities in 
creating a business model in which they invest in a general technology that they trade 
to several downstream application firms?   
Using data on the laser industry, we find that this is the case. As firms age 
they are more—rather than less—likely to adopt a strategy of specialization in 
generality as opposed to specializing in one or a few downstream product markets or 
trading dedicated technologies. Of course, as firms age they are also more likely to 
adopt the standard strategy of specializing in some product markets.  However, we 
find that this is not the only strategy they pursue. Some instead specialize in 
generality. We also find that specialization in generality is more likely when 
downstream markets are homogenous—in the sense that fairly homogenous shares of 
buyers elicit the opportunity to sell technologies that are applicable to different 
markets—and when firms are R&D-intensive. This latter point is also intriguing. 
Specializing in generality is the strategy of companies that are committed to R&D, 
technology, and innovation; therefore, it is likely to be a strategy pursued by most 
innovative companies.  
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Interestingly, today, several firms simultaneously invest in upstream resource 
generality and trade in intermediate markets the services and products deriving from 
their upstream resources. For instance, the most valuable resource that IDEO—a 
leading design company known for pioneering a new business model—has invested in 
is the overall procedural knowledge for designing new ideas. This knowledge was 
developed to be extremely general, such that it could lead to developing products in 
multiple downstream market domains, including electronics, robotics, and apparel. 
However, IDEO has not entered these downstream markets. Rather, by taking 
advantage of corporate downsizing in the 1990s and the creation of “markets for 
designing,” IDEO traded in intermediate markets the services coming from its 
procedural and general knowledge, offering design services to several companies 
operating in several downstream markets (e.g. Apple, AT&T, Samsung, Phillips, 
Amtrak, Steelcase, Baxter International, and NEC Corporation; Conti et al., 2017). 
That companies like IDEO still prosper is consistent with our prediction that 
this can be a sustainable, long-term strategy of firms. And it is even more intriguing 
that Nathan Rosenberg realized this many years ago, when he could rely only on his 
sharp economic logic and a deep understanding of the functioning of markets, 




Table 1. Firm strategies 
 Commercialization mode 
 
 
Cooperative (i.e. via 
arm’s length, 
licensing or alliances) 
Competitive (i.e. 
direct entry) 
Nature of technology 
investment 
No investment in 
general technology 
Simple trading Simple Downstream 
Entry 








Table 2. Summary statistics 
 Count Mean S.D. Min Max 
Specialization in generality 306 .180 .385 0 1 
Cooperative commercialization mode 306 .954 .209 0 1 
Investment in generality 306 .183 .387 0 1 
Firm age 306 22.242 21.007 2 106 
Breadth of demand 306 .689 .133 0 .749 
R&D intensity 306 .321 .218 .001 1 
Number of lasers 306 1.601 1.073 1 5 
Firm size 306 297.871 1618.441 1 21760 
Number of patents 306 58.593 332.066 0 3257 
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Table 3. Pairwise correlations between variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Specialization in 
generality 




0.102 1        
3. Investment in 
generality 
0.989*** 0.063 1       
4. Firm age -0.038 0.057 -0.028 1      
5. Breadth of demand 0.136* 0.032 0.138* 0.119* 1     
6.R&D intensity 0.010 0.015 0.005 -0.496*** -0.220*** 1    
7.Number of lasers -0.048 -0.140* -0.037 0.010 0.111 -0.166** 1   
8.Number of 
employees 
0.153** 0.018 0.159** 0.266*** 0.059 -0.213*** 0.175** 1  
9. Number of patents 0.097 0.037 0.095 0.346*** 0.063 -0.148** -0.072 0.401*** 1 





Table 4. Relationship between firm age and the probability of choosing different strategies: 
Linear probability model 













      
Firm age (t-1) -0.017*** 0.039** 0.039** -0.057*** 0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.006) 
Breadth of demand 0.895*** 0.608** 0.608** 0.287 -0.895*** 
 (0.109) (0.258) (0.258) (0.350) (0.109) 
R&D intensity (t-1) 0.098 -0.043 -0.043 0.140 -0.098 
 (0.091) (0.191) (0.191) (0.170) (0.091) 
Number of lasers (t-1) -0.011 0.002 0.002 -0.013 0.011 
 (0.010) (0.069) (0.069) (0.067) (0.010) 
Firm size (t-1) 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of patents (t-5 to t-
1) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.706*** -1.068** -1.071** 1.778*** 0.290* 
 (0.162) (0.412) (0.412) (0.481) (0.162) 
      
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 
R-squared 0.116 0.291 0.291 0.278 0.116 
Number of firms 88 88 88 88 88 
Log-likelihood 198.1 2.390 2.390 -29.20 198.1 





Table 5. Relationship between firm age and the probability of choosing a specialization in 
generality strategy: Linear probability model 
 (1) (2) (3) 






    
Firm age (t-1) -0.004 0.018 -0.039 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) 
Breadth of demand -0.456 0.593** -0.812* 
 (0.393) (0.261) (0.470) 
Firm age X Breadth of demand 0.063**  0.084** 
 (0.030)  (0.034) 
R&D intensity (t-1) -0.034 -0.830** -0.852** 
 (0.192) (0.308) (0.305) 
Firm age X R&D intensity  0.063*** 0.066*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) 
Number of lasers (t-1) -0.005 0.011 0.001 
 (0.072) (0.066) (0.068) 
Firm size (t-1) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of patents (t-5 to t-1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Constant -0.357 -0.673 0.288 
 (0.299) (0.400) (0.376) 
    
Observations 306 306 306 
R-squared 0.294 0.321 0.327 
Number of firms 88 88 88 
Log-likelihood 3.077 9.017 10.26 
 




Table 6. Relationship between firm age and the probability of choosing a specialization in 
generality strategy (time-invariant measure of R&D intensity) 







    
Firm age (t-1) -0.004 0.004 -0.043 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.028) 
Breadth of demand -0.459 0.512** -0.578 
 (0.387) (0.214) (0.399) 
Firm age X Breadth of demand 0.064**  0.065** 
 (0.030)  (0.029) 
Firm age X R&D intensity  0.110* 0.121* 
  (0.061) (0.066) 
Number of lasers (t-1) -0.006 0.022 0.013 
 (0.069) (0.065) (0.069) 
Firm size (t-1) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of patents (t-5 to t-1) 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Constant -0.368 -0.822** -0.120 
 (0.314) (0.353) (0.300) 
    
Observations 306 306 306 
R-squared 0.294 0.305 0.309 
Number of firms 88 88 88 
Log-likelihood 3.060 5.400 6.343 
 





Table 7. Relationship between firm age and the probability of choosing a specialization in 
generality strategy (specification with logarithm of age, size, and number of patents) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
Firm age (t-1) 0.410*** -0.072 -0.211 -0.548* 
 (0.143) (0.280) (0.171) (0.287) 
Breadth of demand 0.459*** -0.420 0.653* -0.702 
 (0.128) (1.090) (0.361) (0.593) 
Firm age X Breadth of 
demand 
 0.374  0.486* 
  (0.411)  (0.246) 
R&D intensity 0.321* 0.253** -1.319*** -1.351*** 
 (0.181) (0.096) (0.202) (0.187) 
Firm age X R&D 
intensity 
  0.738*** 0.750*** 
   (0.121) (0.114) 
Number of lasers (t-1) -0.001 0.012 0.020 0.017 
 (0.054) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) 
Firm size (t-1) 0.151** 0.134** 0.176*** 0.172*** 
 (0.054) (0.061) (0.058) (0.060) 
Number of patents (t-5 
to t-1) 
-0.121 -0.146 -0.140 -0.140 
 (0.075) (0.085) (0.094) (0.093) 
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Constant -0.695 0.449 0.832** 1.751*** 
 (0.558) (0.499) (0.327) (0.429) 
     
Observations 306 306 306 306 
R-squared 0.157 0.317 0.346 0.348 
Number of firms 88 88 88 88 
Log-likelihood -24.07 8.086 14.75 15.23 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. Relationship between firm age and the probability of choosing other strategies: Linear probability model 
















Firm age (t-1) -0.014 0.017** -0.016 0.018 -0.035* 0.055** 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) 
Breadth of demand -1.673*** -0.895*** -1.686*** 2.129*** 0.302 2.498*** 
 (0.452) (0.109) (0.447) (0.607) (0.353) (0.610) 
Firm age X Breadth of demand 0.046*  0.047* -0.110***  -0.131*** 
 (0.023)  (0.023) (0.032)  (0.035) 
R&D intensity (t-1) -0.091 -0.109 -0.122 0.125 0.939*** 0.974*** 
 (0.089) (0.154) (0.157) (0.172) (0.285) (0.279) 
Firm age X R&D intensity  0.001 0.002  -0.064*** -0.069*** 
  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.021) (0.021) 
Number of lasers (t-1) 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.000 -0.022 -0.006 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.072) (0.065) (0.067) 
Firm size (t-1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of patents (t-5 to t-1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.813*** 0.296* 0.837*** 0.540 1.373*** -0.128 
 (0.278) (0.166) (0.276) (0.454) (0.470) (0.491) 
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306 
R-squared 0.123 0.116 0.124 0.286 0.304 0.315 
Number of firms 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Log-likelihood 199.4 198.1 199.5 -27.52 -23.67 -21.22 
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i We computed generality using all 96 specific applications of a laser across the six 
main markets, to fully capture the real generality of a laser. For instance, a laser that 
can be used in the industrial market, as it can drill and cut, is more general than a laser 
that can only cut: in other words, a firm’s possibility of entering the industrial 
submarket (or of trading the laser in the corresponding intermediate market) is higher 
when provided with the former as opposed to the latter laser. However, our results are 
robust to adopting an alternative measure of generality obtained considering whether 
a laser has at least one application per submarket, without counting the exact number 
of applications. Furthermore, as the application table was just available after 1997, for 
the period 1993–1997 we considered as valid the laser applications in 1998. 
ii Given that firm age and year fixed effects are perfectly collinear when introducing 
firm fixed effects, in the analysis we drop the dummy variables referring to the first 
and the last observation year. Hence, the standalone coefficient of firm age might be 
interpreted as the effect of time passing, in the period between the first and the last 
observation year, on the dependent variable. However, when considering either the 
interaction effect between firm age and demand breadth or between firm age and 
R&D intensity, we find no collinearity issues between firm age, firm fixed effects, 
and year fixed effects. 
